January 2012

  • January 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Brandon L. Garrett, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law and author of "Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong.”


    The Court has decided two cases involving eyewitness evidence in two days, both 8-1 rulings, but with seemingly inconsistent attitudes towards eyewitness identification procedures. The dueling cases touch more on general conduct of police and prosecutors than on core issues regarding reliability of eyewitness memory. But they provide a fascinating look at how the Justices may evaluate trial evidence in criminal cases.

    In the first case, Smith v. Cain, a "single witness" linked Juan Smith to five murders he was convicted of in New Orleans. It was an easy case, with seven Justices joining Chief Justice Roberts' short, clear opinion. At trial, the lone witness said he saw the attacker face to face and was sure Smith was the one. However, it emerged in habeas proceedings that the prosecutor never told the defense that the single witness told police early on that he did not think he could even make an identification of the killer. Maybe he was not an eyewitness at all – just a witness. Police notes documented how in the days right after the crime, he said he “could not ID anyone because [he] couldn’t see faces” and “would not know them if [he] saw them.” Everything hinged on this one witness; there was no other evidence. 

    The Justices readily concluded that such powerful evidence undermining the testimony of the state's only evidence was "material"  and there was a "reasonable probability" that it would have made a difference at trial. This was serious misconduct. 

    In contrast, Justice Thomas, who wrote a lengthy dissent, emphasized how months after the crime, the witness (who he called an “eyewitness”) saw Smith's photo and said, "This is it. I’ll never forget that face." Justice Thomas emphasized that the witness was “confident.” Yet consider the vast body of research on eyewitness memory. The memory of an eyewitness degrades - in a matter of hours, not days. And the the confidence of an eyewitness at trial does not mean much at all as to its accuracy; that much is crystal clear from decades of social science research.

    In the second case the Court decided, the witness did see something, said she saw something, and identified the defendant at the crime scene in person (although not at a photo array and she was not asked to identify him trial). She was a single eyewitness. The vote count was flipped. In Perry v. New Hampshire, it was the lone dissenter who recounted the lessons from three decades of research on eyewitness memory. Justice Sotomayor argued that whether or not police intend to set up an identification procedure, the court should conduct the due process “reliability” analysis. Justice Sotomayor cited to the noteworthy New Jersey Supreme Court decision last fall creating a social science framework to regulate eyewitness memory, to the fine briefing by the American Psychology Association, and to my research on the role that eyewitness misidentifications play in wrongful convictions. (In reading the trials of the first 250 people exonerated by DNA tests, I saw countless examples of eyewitnesses who were certain at trial and claimed they would never forget that face - but DNA tests showed they were wrong.)

  • January 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Stephen I. Vladeck, professor of law and associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law.


    Near the end of her majority opinion in Latif v. Obama (the most recent decision by the D.C. Circuit in the Guantánamo habeas litigation), Judge Janice Rogers Brown offered the following observation:

    As the dissenters warned and as the amount of ink spilled in this single case attests, [the Supreme Court’s] airy suppositions [in Boumediene v. Bush] have caused great difficulty for the Executive and the courts. . . . Boumediene fundamentally altered the calculus of war, guaranteeing that the benefit of intelligence that might be gained—even from high-value detainees—is outweighed by the systemic cost of defending detention decisions. While the court in Boumediene expressed sensitivity to such concerns, it did not find them “dispositive.” Boumediene’s logic is compelling: take no prisoners. Point taken.

    For reasons that I elaborate upon below, Judge Brown’s disturbing lament provides an unfortunately appropriate epigraph to mark the tenth anniversary of the detention of non-citizens without trial at Guantánamo.

    Let’s begin with Judge Brown’s suggestion that the “airy suppositions” in Boumediene “have caused great difficulty for the Executive and the courts.” Because the Boumediene Court left the details of habeas review to the lower courts, the only “airy supposition” to which she can be referring is the underlying requirement that the federal courts provide detainees at Guantánamo with a meaningful opportunity to contest the legality of their detention before a neutral decision-maker. Never mind that, according to the Boumediene majority, it is the Constitution itself that requires such an opportunity; as a pure policy matter, why shouldn’t we want the government to have to explain the basis for holding individuals for 10 years or longer without ordinary adjudications of their guilt (or, at the very least, of their ongoing dangerousness)?

    The answers Judge Brown suggests are because such adjudications (1) interfere with the Executive Branch; and (2) “cause[] great difficulty” for the courts. To the former, that certainly isn’t the position of the Obama administration. Indeed, one could perhaps argue that judicial review bolsters such detention by lending a judicial imprimatur to detention in cases in which the government prevails in the courts. Whether or not that’s a convincing rejoinder, though, Judge Brown offers no explanation for how judicial review otherwise interferes with the Executive Branch in any way more burdensome than requiring it to provide minimal evidence satisfying a fairly broad detention standard (especially under the D.C. Circuit’s case law) behind closed doors. One need look no further than the Latif decision itself to see the pains to which the courts have gone to keep sensitive information out of the public record, and there are to date no documented examples of sensitive information being improperly disclosed in the context of the Guantánamo habeas litigation.

  • January 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Sarah Crawford, Director of Workplace Fairness, National Partnership for Women & Families


    The U.S. Supreme Court is hearing oral argument today in Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals – a case that could erode the right of millions of state workers to take job-protected, unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when faced with a serious illness.

    The FMLA set an important family and medical leave standard that guarantees eligible workers – both women and men – up to 12 weeks of job-protected, unpaid leave to recover from a serious illness or medical condition, including pregnancy or childbirth, or to care for a newborn, a newly adopted child or a seriously ill family member. The FMLA offered leave on a gender-neutral basis rather than creating a special right to self-care leave for medical illness surrounding pregnancy, in part to avoid creating perverse incentives for further discrimination against women.

    Since its enactment 18 years ago, workers have used the FMLA more than 100 million times. The law has helped workers disabled by pregnancy or recovering from childbirth, workers with new babies and dying parents, workers who have had heart attacks and hysterectomies – in short, workers for whom job-protected leave is of critical importance. An adverse decision from the Supreme Court could put access to FMLA self-care leave at risk for millions of state workers. At stake is their fundamental right to take time off to address their own serious medical needs, including pregnancy and childbirth.

    Petitioner Daniel Coleman was working for a Maryland court when his doctor ordered bed rest due to serious illness. Within hours of requesting medical leave, Coleman was fired. He then filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of the FMLA. Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the lower courts ruled that the state of Maryland could not be sued for monetary damages under the FMLA’s self-care provision.

  • January 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Inimai Chettiar, the Policy Counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union, where she serves as national legislative counsel to end mass incarceration in states across the country. She has published scholarship on using economic analysis to advance progressive policies, most recently co-authoring Smart Reform is Possible: States Reducing Incarceration Rates and Costs While Protecting Public Safety and Improving Budget Analysis of State Criminal Justice Reforms: A Strategy for Better Outcomes and Saving Money.


    It’s no secret that the United States is the largest incarcerator in the world. It’s also no secret that our government selectively enforces criminal laws disproportionately against poor people and people of color, resulting in the mass incarceration of black and brown Americans. Now, one in nine black children has a parent in prison; there are more black men under the control of corrections than were enslaved in 1850.  Our addiction to incarceration has decimated the social and economic futures of generations of Americans.

    What might be a secret to most Americans, however, is how the budgetary practices of state legislatures may actually be contributing to the mass incarceration problem. A report released today by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities and the American Civil Liberties Union explains how poorly performed state evaluations of the budgetary consequences of criminal justice legislation are causing some states to spend unnecessarily on prisons while cutting other vital state programs. The report, Improving Budget Analysis of State Criminal Justice Reforms: A Strategy for Better Outcomes and Saving Money, details how a change to the way states perform budget evaluations of proposed legislation could help reduce our incarceration rate – and save states money.

    Across the nation, state governments are mired in economic crisis. Unfortunately, many states have taken a short-term attitude toward solving their economic problems: in order to balance budgets in the current year, they cut spending on essential public programs like schools, public assistance, and infrastructure. At the same time, almost all states have increased their spending on prisons. Over the last 25 years, state corrections spending grew by 674 percent, outpacing the growth of other spending to become the fourth-largest category of state spending. Currently, almost $70 billion of our annual collective tax dollars go to our penal system, often toward incarcerating people who pose little or no safety risks.

  • January 10, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    The U.S. Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments today on the constitutionality of sanctioning television and radio broadcasters for indecency, even where the use of an expletive is unscripted and “fleeting” or “isolated.”  

    The decision in this case has the potential to be “really quite a blockbuster” if it reopens past Supreme Court precedent that gave the government special latitude to regulate matters that are broadcast on the public airwaves, explained former acting solicitor general Neal Katyal during the American Constitution Society’s recent Supreme Court preview.

    In the lower court decision holding the Federal Communications Commission policy unconstitutional, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that technology has changed since the Supreme Court decided in FCC v. Pacifica that broadcasting is a unique medium.

    Constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky explains this argument in a recent column for The National Law Journal: