Press

  • August 29, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Geoffrey R. Stone, a constitutional law professor at the University of Chicago, and chair of the American Constitution Society’s Board of Directors. Professor Stone will be a panelist during an ACS Symposium this Thursday on legal policy shifts in the ten years since 9/11. Register for the symposium here.


    War inevitably intensifies the tension between individual liberty and national security. But there are wise and unwise ways to strike the appropriate balance. In the years after 9/11, the Bush administration embraced a series of policies — including torture, surveillance of private communications, clandestine detention of American citizens, and secret prisons in Eastern Europe — that undermined the fundamental American values of individual dignity, personal privacy, and due process of law.

    In my view, however, the most dangerous policy of the Bush administration was its attempt to hide its decisions from the American public. In an effort to evade the constraints of separation of powers, judicial review, checks and balances, and democratic accountability, the Bush administration systematically promulgated its policies in secret, denied information to Congress, abused the classification process, narrowly interpreted the Freedom of Information Act, punished government whistleblowers, jailed journalists for refusing to disclose their confidential sources, threatened to prosecute the press for revealing the administration’s secret programs, and broadly invoked executive immunity and the state secrets doctrine to prevent both Congress and the courts from evaluating the lawfulness of its programs.

    By shielding its decisions from legal, congressional, and public scrutiny, the Bush administration undermined the single most central premise of a self-governing society: it is the citizens who must evaluate the judgments, policies, and programs of their representatives. As James Madison observed, “A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”

  • June 27, 2011

    The Obama administration’s disappointing record on government transparency is a lesson in the limits of the “trust us” approach to governing, writes ACS Board Chair Geoffrey R. Stone in an op-ed in The New York Times.

    Stone, a constitutional law professor at the University of Chicago who worked with President Obama at the university and acted as an informal adviser to Obama’s presidential campaign, laments that President Obama has not lived up to the promises of “Senator Obama” to “promote openness and public accountability in government policy making.”

    Stone points to the journalist-source privilege, whistleblower protection and the state secrets privilege as areas in which President Obama has shown a “disappointing willingness” to continue the Bush administration policy of hiding its decisions from the American public. He notes that one bright spot in Obama’s record was his repeal of a Bush administrative directive that allowed broad classification of government information.

    Nonetheless, he writes, “[t]he record of the Obama administration on this fundamental issue of American democracy has surely fallen short of expectations.”

    He continues:

  • January 4, 2011
    Spurred by the disclosure of classified government information by WikiLeaks Congress is considering a broad measure that if enacted would undermine free speech rights, writes constitutional law scholar Geoffrey R. Stone in an op-ed for The New York Times.

    The bill, pending in both chambers, would make it a crime for anyone to "knowingly and willfully" disseminate information "prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States." Stone, a law professor at the University of Chicago and chair of the ACS Board, says that while the measure "may be constitutional as applied to government employees who unlawfully leak such material to people who are unauthorized to receive it, it would plainly violate the First Amendment to punish anyone who might publish or otherwise circulate the information after it has been leaked. At the very least, the act must be expressly limited to situations in which the spread of the classified information poses a clear and imminent danger of grave harm to the nation."

    Stone continues:

    The clear and present danger standard has been a central element of our First Amendment jurisprudence ever since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s 1919 opinion in Schenk v. United States. In the 90 years since, the precise meaning of ‘clear and present danger' has evolved, but the animating principle was stated brilliantly by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in his 1927 concurring opinion in Whitney v. California. The founders ‘did not exalt order at the cost of liberty,' wrote Brandeis; on the contrary, they understood that ‘only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such ... is the command of the Constitution. It is, therefore, always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.'

    In December, Professor Stone testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on the bill, which is dubbed the "Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act," or SHIELD Act. His written testimony before the committee is available here.

  • December 17, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Stephen I. Vladeck, a professor at American University Washington College of Law. Vladeck testified at yesterday's House Judiciary Committee Hearing (pictured) on the legal and constitutional issues raised by WikiLeaks. Video of the full hearing is available here.
    One of the most refreshing things about yesterday's House Judiciary Committee hearing on "The Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks," at which I was one of the seven witnesses, was the focus of the conversation. Rather than the WikiLeaks bashfest I initially feared that the hearing might turn into, an overwhelming majority of the conversation (and of the Members' questions) focused on prospective reforms to federal espionage, whistleblower, and classification laws, and not just for the "next" WikiLeaks situation. Instead, folks seemed to take seriously the myriad ways in which the vagueness and ambiguity of the current Espionage Act ultimately redounds to the benefit of no one (a point that Abbe Lowell, Ken Wainstein, and I each elaborated upon in our testimony).

    If one theme came through in particular, it was the need for federal law to formally distinguish between three distinct classes of cases: (1) traditional espionage, where a spy steals national security secrets in order to benefit a foreign power; (2) unauthorized leaking by government employees; and (3) the retention and retransmission of classified information by private citizens with no intent to harm national security or benefit a foreign power. With regard to the first category, I think most were in agreement that, although the key is a strong and precise specific intent requirement, such a requirement would go a long way toward both obviating any First Amendment concerns and limiting the statute to that conduct that really is classical espionage, with appropriately harsh corresponding penalties.

  • December 1, 2010

    The release by WikiLeaks of some 250,000 previously confidential diplomatic cables has raised new questions about First Amendment protection for WikiLeaks, and for those media outlets that publish information they obtain from WikiLeaks, or other similar sources.

    The Department of Justice is investigating WikiLeaks' publication of sensitive documents, and federal officials told The Washington Post they are considering criminal charges under the Espionage Act for WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange.

    U.S. media outlets took different approaches in deciding whether to publish the WikiLeaks information. The New York Times provided an extensive explanation of its decision to publish, after obtaining the documents from an anonymous source. But The Wall Street Journal and CNN declined to enter into a confidentiality agreement with WikiLeaks in order to obtain some of the documents, WSJ reports.

    During a recent ACS event, experts provided some helpful First Amendment perspective on the WikiLeaks phenomenon, including how First Amendment protection of sensitive information has developed and what place shield laws that protect anonymous sources have in this discussion.

    Moderator Adam Liptak, Supreme Court correspondent for The New York Times, and a former lawyer for the newspaper, framed the discussion in saying:

    The great democratization of information on the Internet, notably in the form of WikiLeaks, means there is no responsible party to negotiate with on the other side. For better or worse, we [The New York Times] held back on the warrantless wiretapping story, in part because we consulted with, and were persuaded by, things the government was telling us. We may have made the wrong decision, but it wasn't for want of trying to get it right, trying to strike the balance correctly. That doesn't seem to be the case in many quarters on the Internet today. So, we live in a new world.

    ACS has compiled some of the most relevant comments in a WikiLeaks highlights video below. Watch the full discussion on the interplay between national security and government transparency here, including a keynote address by White House Open Government Initiative Director and U.S. Deputy Chief Technology Officer Beth Noveck.