racial profiling

  • July 12, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    New York City’s leaders, most notably its billionaire mayor, are bent on supporting a stop-and-frisk policy that according to the police department’s own numbers overwhelmingly target minorities.

    Mayor Michael Bloomberg continues to defend the policy, which allows police officers to stop-and-frisk people in the city on suspicion of criminal activity.

    Recently Bloomberg took to a church in Brooklyn to trumpet the policy, saying, “We are not going to going to walk away from a strategy that we know saves lives.” And although he went on to claim city officials would strive to carry out stop-and-frisk “properly,” he has also denigrated Philadelphia’s efforts to reform its frisking policies. “Why would anyone want to trade what we have here for the situation in Philadelphia – more murders, higher crime?” he said in May.

    But numbers regarding stops and frisks show that the policy hardly deters crime, let alone saves lives. According to statistics from the New York Police Department more than 680,000 people were stopped in 2011 and in 88 percent of the stops no arrests were made.

    The numbers do, however, show that racial profiling is taking place. Of the nearly 686,000 people stopped last year 84 percent of them were black or Latino, The Times reports. Pace University law professor Randolph M. McLaughlin told the newspaper, “People are starting to wonder: ‘What’s really going on here? Is this a racial policy?”

    Noting that courts are increasingly assessing stop-and-frisk tactics, McLaughlin added, “And judges read newspapers too.”

    In May, U.S. District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin permitted a class-action lawsuit against the New York Police Department’s policy, saying she was seriously concerned about officials’ “troubling apathy towards New Yorkers’ most fundamental constitutional rights.”

  • April 26, 2012
    BookTalk
    The Immigration Crucible
    Transforming Race, Nation, and the Limits of the Law
    By: 
    Philip A. Kretsedemas

    By Philip A. Kretsedemas, an associate professor of sociology at The University of Massachusetts Boston


    For the past two years, the national debate over police involvement in immigration enforcement has focused on Arizona Senate Bill 1070. When it was first enacted, SB 1070 was widely criticized for the broad discretion it allowed Arizona police to question people about their legal status. Much of this criticism focused on the problem of immigrant racial profiling. Opponents of the bill argued that it opened the door for the indiscriminate interrogation of anyone who looks like an unauthorized migrant.

    Even though these complaints figured prominently in the public debate over SB 1070, it is rather telling that they have dropped out of the legal arguments that have been marshaled against the bill. One reason for this curious situation is that complaints about racial profiling and selective enforcement have historically been framed as violations of Fourth Amendment rights. But it also so happens that the legal challenge against SB 1070 is being led by the Department of Justice which, for obvious reasons, is not interested in setting legal precedents that would limit the search and seizure power of the police. The Supreme Court, which is currently deliberating over the DOJ's lawsuit against SB 1070, also has a history of favoring the discretionary powers of law enforcement over Fourth Amendment considerations.

    It is important to keep this context in mind when evaluating the legal arguments that are being levied against SB 1070. The DOJ is advancing a finely pitched argument which takes issue with the law making powers of local governments but not the search and seizure practices of law enforcement. It is also bears noting that the DOJ is not opposing local immigration laws on principle. The DOJ supported Arizona's employer sanctions law (penalizing businesses that hire unauthorized migrants) which was subsequently upheld by the 9th Circuit and Supreme Court. The federal government also doesn't seem to be opposed, on principle, to the involvement of police in enforcing federal immigration laws. The Obama administration has actually given state and local police new opportunities to enforce immigration laws. It has only taken issue with local enforcement practices that operate outside of the federal-local enforcement arrangements that have already been authorized by federal law.

  • April 25, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Arizona’s racial profiling law, which has prompted other states to enact or consider similar measures, appears to have a strong chance of surviving Supreme Court scrutiny.

    Following oral argument in Arizona v. United States, Adam Liptak, high court correspondent for The New York Times, wrote that justices “across the ideological spectrum appeared inclined to uphold a controversial part,” of the law, and Robert Barnes, of The Washington Post, said the Court “seemed receptive” to the state’s argument that its racial profiling law “was a valid exercise of its power to protect its borders.”

    SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston reports that the justices “focused tightly on the actual operation of the four specific provisions of the law at issue, and most of the Court seemed prepared to accept that Arizona police would act in measured ways as they arrest and detain individuals they think might be in the U.S. illegally.”

    Reporting for TPM, Sahil Kapur said that while it appeared “some aspects” of Arizona’s law might survive, “no clear majority emerged one way or another.” Kapur noted that several of the justices appeared to wrestle “with how far states can go in writing immigration laws before they encroach on what is widely regarded as federal turf.”

    Although it appeared, as Denniston noted, the justices were confident that Arizona police would act reasonably in enforcing the law, an account from a longtime Arizona citizen suggests the reality of enforcement holds otherwise.

    In a piece for The Guardian Jim Shee, an American citizen of Chinese and Spanish descent writes of his encounters with Arizona police after enactment of S.B. 1070.

    Shee tells of two incidents where Arizona cops stopped him and demanded documentation of his citizenship, calling them “humiliating and terrifying.”

    His wife, a Japanese-American “faces the specter of the same police scrutiny,” he writes. “The law invites police to rely on their racial bias when deciding who to stop, so our skin color means we’re more likely to be targeted. Like most Americans, I never carried around my passport. Now, my wife and I always take ours when we leave the house.”

    Shee concludes, in part, that the “days when laws were passed that led to discrimination should be confined to their history classes.”

    Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) during a Senate hearing yesterday on Arizona’s anti-immigrant law said that he and other senators may introduce legislation aimed at barring the states from creating a patchwork of immigration laws.

  • April 19, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Christina Swarns, LDF Director of the Criminal Justice Practice, and Eva Paterson, Equal Justice Society President and Co-Founder. Paterson is also a member of the Bay Area Lawyer Chapter Board of Advisors.


    Few cases involving the intersection of race, criminal law, and procedure have had the reach and impact of McCleskey v. Kemp, a United States Supreme Court decision decided 25 years ago, on April 22, 1987. This decision set the stage for more than 20 years of dramatically increasing racial disparities within the criminal justice system.

    In McCleskey, the Supreme Court declared that a criminal justice system that treats Blacks worse than whites is “inevitable” and that the Constitution is only violated by instances of intentional racial discrimination by individual actors in specific cases. 

    Specifically, the Court refused to set aside the death sentence of Warren McCleskey, an African American man who was sentenced to death in Georgia for the killing of a white person, despite the fact that statistical evidence demonstrated that in Georgia capital cases, African Americans were more likely to receive a death sentence than any other defendants, and that African American defendants who killed white victims were the most likely to be sentenced to death.

    The implications of the McCleskey decision are profound. Because of McCleskey, there is no remedy for – and, indeed, no constitutional problem with – the fact that Blacks are disproportionately stopped, searched, arrested, held on bail, charged with serious crimes (including death-eligible offenses), denied plea bargains, convicted, and sentenced to prison or execution. 

    There is no constitutional basis for challenging the fact that one in three African American males will enter state or federal prison at some point in his lifetime; and that although African Americans make up only 12 percent of the U.S. population, they amount to 44 percent of sentenced inmates – the largest group behind bars. 

  • April 5, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Angela J. Davis, Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law


    The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a jailhouse strip search of a man who was wrongfully arrested for a minor offense in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington. Mr. Florence was riding in his car with his pregnant wife and son (his wife was driving) when a police officer pulled them over. The officer ran Mr. Florence’s name through his computer and discovered a warrant for his arrest. The warrant was issued when Mr. Florence (pictured) failed to appear at a contempt hearing regarding fines that he had not paid. Mr. Florence did appear, and he paid the fines, but the warrant was not removed from the computer database. Mr. Florence actually showed the police officer written documentation that he had complied with the court’s order, but the officer arrested him anyway. Mr. Florence was incarcerated for six days and subjected to two complete strip searches requiring him to lift his genitals, squat, cough and spread his buttocks.  He was ultimately released when a court discovered the mistake. 

    The 5-4 decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by the conservative wing of the court, rejected Mr. Florence’s argument that the searches were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court also rejected Mr. Florence’s proposal that new detainees arrested for minor offenses be exempt from strip searches unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe they are hiding contraband. The Court called the proposal “unworkable” – an interesting characterization considering the fact that the proposal seems to be working just fine in the ten states where the reasonable suspicion standard is currently the law.