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By Anthony F. Renzo, Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Professor Renzo specializes in constitutional law and litigation.

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Wielding the Eighth Amendment as a sword, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida outlawed as "cruel and unusual" punishment the imposition of life without parole sentences for all persons convicted of non-homicide offenses when they were juveniles (17 and younger). The Court held that life sentences for juveniles who do not kill violate the Eighth Amendment unless such juveniles have "some meaningful opportunity" to seek release by demonstrating rehabilitation and reform.

Terrance Jamar Ghaham was 17 years old at the time he violated his probation on an armed burglary offense. He was sentenced to life imprisonment by a trial judge who concluded that Graham was incorrigible despite recommendations of limited term sentences by the Department of Corrections and the State prosecutor. Since Florida had abolished its parole system for all crimes, the life sentence left Graham with no opportunity for release for the rest of his life barring executive clemency. Graham's Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence was rejected on appeal to the Florida District Court of Appeal, which concluded that Graham was "incapable of rehabilitation." In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed, finding such sentences so disproportionate and rare that they could not bear the weight of the Eighth Amendment.

That the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments extends to prison sentences has been treated as settled law for 100 years until the appointment of the current crop of arch-conservatives to the Court, led by Scalia and Thomas, who, joined by Justice Alito, dissented in Graham. Their view is that the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment was limited to outrageous methods of punishment such as torture and did not extend to the proportionality of prison sentences, which, according to their theory, was left to the limitless discretion of State and federal legislative bodies. The majority in Graham takes a quite different approach. In a complete rejection of the dissenters' rigid and narrow reading of "cruel and unusual punishments," the Court reaffirms once again that "courts must look beyond historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Inherent in this process is an inquiry into "proportionality," which is "central to the Eighth Amendment."

The Court did not stop at reaffirming the application of an Eighth Amendment proportionality calculus to prison sentences, however. For the first time the Court subjected a prison sentence to categorical restrictions, in this case outlawing all life without parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders. While the use of categorical rules to enforce the Eighth Amendment is not new when applied to the death penalty, its application to the terms of a prison sentence is both new and noteworthy. Before Graham, the conventional wisdom limited categorical restrictions to certain classes of offenders only when sentenced to death. Indeed, the Court concedes that it has not considered previously a categorical challenge to a term-of-years prison sentence. Nonetheless, while acknowledging that "death is different" than any prison sentence, the Court found that "life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other offenders." These common characteristics include that "the sentence alters the offenders life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable," and deprives the offender of "the most basic liberties without hope of restoration."

The Court cites Florida's juvenile sentencing practices as examples of why Eighth Amendment guarantees for juvenile offenders cannot be adequately protected from arbitrary sentencing decisions in the absence of a categorical prohibition. The Court found nothing in the Florida law that prevented its courts from sentencing a juvenile non-homicide offender such as Graham to life without parole based on a "subjective judgment" that the defendant's crimes demonstrate a character that is irreversibly depraved and not subject to reform. Under the Eighth Amendment, the sentencing court cannot be allowed to base its sentence on subjective assumptions that a juvenile is beyond hope. As the Court said when it outlawed the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, "it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."

The Court viewed these life without parole sentences as the equivalent of being sentenced to die in prison, which was constitutionally unacceptable for non-homicide offenses given most juveniles inherent potential for rehabilitation as they mature. Even crimes of violence, including rape, did not warrant life without parole, and the Court was unwilling to leave juveniles who had not killed at the risk of overzealous state officials mistakenly imposing such an irreversible sentence for reasons of passion or prejudice. Indeed, the Court makes special mention of the facts in Sullivan v. Florida, the companion case argued the same day as Graham, as a second example of how Florida sentencing practices were insufficient to protect juveniles who were not killers from unconstitutionally cruel punishments. (Sullivan's petition was dismissed as improvidently granted, presumably for procedural reasons unrelated to the merits.) Although Sullivan was only 13 years old when sentenced to life without parole, his crime was rape, a crime of violence arguably more heinous than Graham's crimes. Nonetheless, the Court made clear that sentences such as Sullivan's were imposed "based only on a discretionary, subjective judgment by a judge or jury that the offender is irredeemably depraved," and such systems are not capable of preventing life without parole sentences "despite insufficient culpability." While acknowledging that categorical rules tend to be imperfect, the Court concluded that a "clear line" is necessary to eliminate an undue risk of irreversible life sentences for minors who do not kill and whose capacity for change and growth cannot be accurately measured by society.

Not only are minors at risk of arbitrary life without parole sentences in the absence of Eighth Amendment limitations, the Court had little difficulty in finding a national consensus opposed to the use of such sentences. Such a consensus demonstrates how rare and, hence, "unusual" it is for states to employ such punishments. The Court found convincing that there are only 129 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving life without parole sentences in the U.S., with 77 of those imprisoned in Florida and the remainder in just 10 states and the federal system. The Court discounted the fact that the sentencing laws in 37 States allow for such sentences, reasoning that it was never imposed in 27 of those states. According the Court in Graham, the mere fact that such a sentence is theoretically possible under general statutory sentencing schemes does not necessarily mean that legislators deliberately concluded that such a sentence was appropriate. For example, Florida acknowledged at oral argument that even a 5 year old could receive a life without parole sentence under the letter of the law, but it does not follow that such a penalty was endorsed through deliberate and full legislative consideration merely because the legislature voted for a system that in general makes juveniles eligible for life without parole sentences. The Court made clear in Graham that actual sentencing practices are a more important component of the consensus inquiry than looking at the face of legislation. Indeed, that it was seldom used when it was available was further evidence that the sentence was disfavored by state criminal justice systems. Concluding that life without parole sentences for juveniles who do not kill were exceedingly rare, the Court ruled that a national consensus had developed against it.

Support for the Court's conclusion was provided by international opinion. While not controlling as authority, the Court followed its "longstanding practice" of noting the global consensus against life without parole sentences for non-lethal crimes committed by persons under the age of 18. In fact, the U.S. is the only nation in the world that imposes life without parole sentences on juvenile non-homicide offenders. Moreover, Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1989 by all countries of the world except the U.S., prohibits the imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of release for offenses committed by persons below 18 years of age.

While the Court's decision in Graham forbids government from throwing away the key when it locks up juveniles who are not killers, it is also important to keep in mind what the decision does not do. First, it does not explicitly address the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences of a definite term that are imposed without the possibility of parole. Second, Graham does not guarantee the release of juveniles during their natural lives, only that juveniles sentenced to life for non-homicide offenses must be given "some realistic opportunity" to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

On the other hand Graham does forbid the State from making judgments at the time of sentencing that these juvenile offenders will never be fit to reenter society. Preserving some glimmer of hope for minors who could spend the rest of their lives in prison seems a small price to pay for not deferring to the opinions of 18th Century slave owners on what punishments transgress Eighth Amendment standards of humane treatment. As the Court in Graham reminds us, it is an "essential principle" under the Eighth Amendment that "the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes."

 

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By Jody Kent and Beth Colgan. Kent is director and national coordinator of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, and Colgan is the managing attorney of the Institutions Project at Columbia Legal Services. Kent and Colgan are authors of an Issue Brief recently published by ACS called "A Just Alternative to Sentencing Youth to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of Parole."

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The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Graham v. Florida, has conclusively established that for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, youth are different-and therefore are afforded greater protections-than adults. In establishing a categorical ban on sentencing youth who have committed non-homicide offenses to life in prison without the possibility of parole (whether the constitution prohibits the sentence in homicide cases was not in front of the Court), the Court relied on longstanding precedent related to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which "underscore the essential principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes." (7)

The human attributes at issue in Graham, were the unique characteristics of youth. As in its 2005 opinion in Roper v. Simmons, which outlawed the imposition of the death penalty against minors, the Court looked to psychosocial and scientific research that show "fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds" linked to decision making, moral reasoning, and culpability. (17) As Amici including the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Medical Association and American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry explained in detail, as a result of anatomical differences between juvenile and adult brains and differing degrees of psychosocial development, youth do not have adult levels of judgment, impulse control, or the ability to assess risks. These same differences mean that youth are more amenable than adults to positive character development and rehabilitation.

That those unique qualities of youth make it impossible for a judge to know at sentencing whether a youth is truly incorrigible, or whether he or she may someday be rehabilitated and redeemed, resonated throughout the Court's opinion. (22) That principle led the majority to conclude that a categorical ban on the sentence was required. While Chief Justice John Roberts joined the majority in concluding that youth must be afforded greater protections under the Eighth Amendment than adults, in his concurring opinion, he argued that a case-by-case proportionality analysis where age is considered at sentencing was a sufficient remedy. In the majority opinion, however, Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected such an approach, writing that the courts could not "with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change." (27)

In addition to ensuring that decisions about a youth's amenability to rehabilitation are not made when his or her character is not yet formed, the categorical ban instituted by the Court has the benefit of eliminating the arbitrary nature by which the sentence has been imposed. In our May 2010 Issue Brief, we set forth data showing that the sentencing of youth to life in prison without the possibility of parole is applied inconsistently and arbitrarily, particularly against youth who are first time offenders, youth who live in particular geographic regions, and youth of color. While the Graham ruling does not remedy these problems for youth sentenced in homicide cases, it does ensure that for youth convicted in non-homicides, the risk of arbitrary application of a life without parole sentence is abolished.

While the Court's ruling that the Eighth Amendment forbids States "from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society," (24) the second chance afforded to some youth by the Court does not guarantee release from prison. Consistent with the recommendation we made in our Issue Brief, under Graham, the Court requires States to provide juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses with "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." (24) Only those who are able to demonstrate such a change would be released.

The Court's rationale is sound. While Graham provides important relief for some youth, States may still subject youth who commit homicide with a life without parole sentence--one that "forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal." (23) However, the basis of the decision-that the fundamental differences between youth and adults make youth less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation-are true of all youth, even those convicted in homicide cases. Even those youth may become rehabilitated and redeemed, a fact that cannot be determined at the time of sentencing. As such, we urge States and the federal government to reform existing laws not just to comport with Graham, but to ensure that all youth have a meaningful opportunity to earn release in a manner that holds youth who commit serious crimes accountable, while still recognizing their inherent capacity for change.

 

 

 

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By Stephen K. Harper and Randy A. Hertz. Harper is an Adjunct Professor of Juvenile Justice, University of Miami School of Law, and Hertz is the Director of Clinical and Advocacy Programs and Professor of Clinical Law, NYU School of Law.

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In Graham v Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed what it found in Roper v Simmons: kids are different. In Roper, children and adolescents were found to be so different from adults that, as a class, they should not be eligible for death. Graham found that these differences now apply in non-homicide cases where juveniles were sentenced to life without any possibility of parole. In Roper, the Court recognized what we know instinctively -- and what science continues to teach us -- that "juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility'; they are ‘more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences, including peer pressure' and their characteristics are ‘not as well formed.'"

The Court found that life without any possibility of parole is a sentence that simply means there is no chance for the young offender to later "demonstrate growth and maturity." It is that maturity that "can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal and rehabilitation." An adolescent sentenced to life in prison without any possibility of parole stands for the proposition that some children are completely finished before they are even completed.

Juveniles are less culpable precisely because they don't have the same mature judgment, sense of consequence and sense of self as does an adult. They are developmentally immature in areas of impulse control, sensation-seeking, future orientation, and susceptibility to peer pressure and other external influences. They are also more changeable and malleable than adults. Indeed as stated in the amicus brief (in support of Graham) by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association, juveniles "unformed identity makes it less likely that their offenses evince a fixed bad character and more likely that they will reform." And, as was further pointed out by the amicus brief of American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, "the structural and functional immaturities of the adolescent brain provide (even) a biological basis for the behavioral immaturities." (Emphasis added)

It is important to note that none of this means that any juvenile offender is guaranteed a release from prison. (For more on juvenile life sentences without parole, see the Equal Justice Initiative.) Many juvenile offenders found guilty of non-homicide offenses will indeed spend the rest of their lives in prison. What the Court did hold is that because Graham was a juvenile at the time of his crime, he is now entitled to "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." The Court found that the Eighth Amendment "does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders will never be fit to reenter society."(Emphasis added)

As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, "knowledge accumulates. We learn, sometimes, from our mistakes. Punishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one time may, in light of reason and experience, be found to be cruel and unusual at a later time." Indeed, the legal standards for measuring what is "cruel and unusual" are "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

Justice Thomas argued in his dissent that the holding of Roper dealing with the many differences between kids and adults should have been confined to death penalty cases."The Constitution gives special protections to capital defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment..." That is, death is different. His argument was that in non-death cases, like this one, the Court has always given and should give "substantial deference to legislative choices regarding the proper length of prison sentences."

The majority of the Court unequivocally rejected Justice Thomas' position.

The arguments in Graham v Florida basically came down to which "difference" is more important. Was it that death is different and therefore the findings and holdings of Roper should be confined only to death penalty cases? Or was it that the differences between kids and adults are simply far more important than any legal doctrine. That kids are different prevailed, as it should have.

 

The Supreme Court ruled in two closely watched cases involving sentencing of juveniles and the ability of federal officials to indefinitely imprison "sexually dangerous" inmates.

In Graham v. Florida, the Court's majority held that it is unconstitutional to sentence juvenile offenders, who have not killed anyone, to life in prison with no chance of parole. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded that Florida officials had violated the Eighth Amendment rights of Terrance Graham when they sentenced him for robberies he committed as a juvenile to a life sentence with no chance of parole. Kennedy wrote, "The state has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit." Justices Antonin Scalia, Thomas and Alito filed a dissenting opinion. In analysis for SCOTUSblog, Lyle Denniston writes that the decision "produced an outpouring of writing from the Court, including a fervent complaint by three dissenters that the majority was simply using raw power to rule by ‘judicial fiat,' but the ruling's practical effect on juvenile offenders was far from clear. In declaring that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment is violated by a life-without parole sentence for a juvenile whose crime did not involve murder, the Court did make a new constitutional declaration. That is a flat, or categorical, rule, and thus it lays down the juvenile sentencing rule from here on - but for new sentencing proceedings only, it appears."

The Sentencing Project lauded the high court's decision in Graham, saying, "There needs to be consequences for youth who commit serious crimes, but these need to be age-appropriate measures that do not preclude the possibility of change."

In U.S. v. Comstock, the high court ruled that federal officials can indefinitely detain some prisoners considered "sexually dangerous" after they have completed their criminal sentences. Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that Congress did not exceed its constitutional authority with passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which authorizes the federal government to continue to detain prisoners who were convicted of sexually violent crimes and suffered from mental illness. Breyer wrote that the "Constitution grants Congress legislative power sufficient to enact" the law, The Associated Press reported.

The practice of sentencing juvenile offenders of serious crimes to life in prison with no chance of parole is not effective and a different approach should be used, write the authors of a recent ACS Issue Brief. In "A Just Alternative to Sentencing Youth to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of Parole," Jody Kent, of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, and Beth Colgan, of the Institutions Project at Columbia Legal Services, write that no other country except America sentences juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole, a practice banned by the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child.

The authors cite the significance of research showing that juvenile offenders should be treated differently than adults:

Youth do not have adult levels of judgment, impulse control, or ability to assess risks. There is widespread agreement among child development researchers that young people who commit crimes are more likely to reform their behavior and have a better chance of rehabilitation than adults.

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering two cases involving the constitutionality of sentencing youth to life in prison without parole. Oral argument in Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida were heard in November and decisions in the cases are expected soon. For more on the constitutional issue in those cases, see a guest post from constitutional law expert Charles Ogletree here. 

[image via lawanddisorder.org]

 

Following a recent National Press Club event on criminal justice policy, the Open Society Institute's Senior Policy Analyst Nkechi Taifa talked with ACSblog about the timeliness for new approaches to dealing with crime. Taifa said that the typical tough-on-crime approaches have failed, and that a new "integrative" approach was needed. She said there is hope now for new criminal justice policies because of "courageous lawmakers," such as Sen. Jim Webb and Rep. Bobby Scott, who have introduced legislation that would advance new approaches to criminal justice.

"Prospects for reform are bright," Taifa said. "The political will is there." Webb and Scott both participated in the ACS event on criminal justice policy. A YouTube clip of Webb's comments is here and a portion of Scott's comments is here. Video of the entire event is available here. Watch Taifa's interview below or download it as a podcast here.

 

 

At a recent ACS event exploring criminal justice policy, Sen. Jim Webb and Rep. Robert C. Scott said the nation needs to confront shortcomings of the criminal justice system.

Below are two YouTube clips of the lawmakers' comments. Webb discussed legislation he is sponsoring, the National Criminal Justice Commission Act, and Rep. Scott said that tough-on-crime laws have proven ineffective and costly.

Webb said, "America's criminal justice system is broken and its inequities cut against the notion that we are a society founded on fundamental fairness. I believe that it is time to bring together the best minds in America to confer, report, and make concrete recommendations about how we can reform the process."

Rep. Scott said, "Research clearly demonstrates that a comprehensive approach - a strategy of prevention, early intervention and rehabilitation will significantly reduce crime and usually save more money than you spend it the process." Video of the event, including the lawmakers' entire comments, is available here.

 

PTSD Defense via "Selective Empathy": ACS Board member Linda Greenhouse on the Supreme Court overturning a veteran's death sentence.

Huckabee & Clemmons' Clemency: The former governor's persistent defense of clemency for an apparent cop-killer.

Civil Disobedience or Epidemic?: Following the jailing of their colleague, 20 courthouse deputies call in sick.

Crime-fighting with Criminology: Cincinnati's "unusual" approach to combatting gang violence.

Re-Thinking the System: Sen. Jim Webb and other special guests join ACS for a major event on Wed. 12/9 to assess the shortcomings and opportunities in our country's approach to criminal justice.

[Image via Daniel Y. Go.]

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two Florida cases involving whether life sentences for juveniles, with no chance of parole, violate the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Associated Press reports that the justices appear "sharply divided" over the issue. The news service notes that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that "because of immaturity, you can't really judge a teenager at the point of sentencing," but that Justice Samuel Alito seemed to side with Florida, which is arguing that that the juveniles' punishment does not raise constitutional concerns.

In analysis for SCOTUSblog, Lyle Denniston writes that Chief Justice John Roberts "made a strong - and repeated - effort on Monday to recruit a majority of the Supreme Court in favor of giving juveniles more chance to use their age to challenge life-without-parole prison terms, as an alternative to a flat constitutional bar against ever imposing that sentence." Denniston explains that Roberts' "alternative would apparently be a declaration that the Constitution's Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment required judges to take the offender's youth into account in setting any sentence for term of years, then judge whether that sentence was ‘proportional' both for an offender of that age and for the particular crime."

Sullivan v. Florida involves the sentence of Joe Sullivan, who as 13 when the state sentenced him for life without parole for a sexual assault conviction. Graham v. Florida involves Terrance Graham who was sentenced at 17 after violating his probation. The Washington Post reports that nationwide more than 100 people "are serving life sentences without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles that did not result in a death ...."

In a guest post for ACSBlog, Harvard Law School Professor Charles Ogletree analyzed the cases and concluded, in part, that the Supreme Court should affirm its "reasoning put forth in Roper v. Simmons, which struck down capital punishment for juveniles. Roper established what every parent knows and what science confirms: adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in maturity and judgment." 

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By Charles Ogletree, Jesse Climenko Professor of Law & Director of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at is Harvard Law School. Ogletree submitted an Amicus brief in support of Petitioners with the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

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The United States Supreme Court will hold oral arguments on November 9 in two cases, Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. Florida, which will determine whether it is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to sentence an adolescent who committed a non-homicide offense to life in prison with no opportunity for release.

Petitioners Joe Sullivan and Terrance Graham were both sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for offenses that did not involve homicide in Florida. Sullivan was 13 years old when he was sentenced to spend the remainder of his natural life in prison. Graham received life without parole for a parole violation at 17 years old. He was sentenced without a trial.

Sullivan and Graham present an opportunity for the Court to affirm the reasoning put forth in Roper v. Simmons, which struck down capital punishment for juveniles. Roper established what every parent knows and what science confirms: adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in maturity and judgment.

The extensive body of research on adolescent development proves that adolescents have not reached the level of mental or emotional development that allows adults to make mature decisions, think through consequences, and control their impulses. This same developmental immaturity also makes adolescents the strongest candidates for rehabilitation as they grow older.

In Roper, the Court asserted that these significant developmental differences have direct bearing on the culpability of adolescents. The Court ruled that their immature judgment, impulsive decision-making, vulnerability to peer pressure, and inherent potential for rehabilitation reduce culpability such that sentencing them to death violates the Eighth Amendment.

These principles should be applied to the constitutionality of juvenile life-without-parole sentencing. The same transient qualities of adolescence that the Court relied upon in Roper make it similarly inappropriate to subject a teenager to a permanent punishment of life in prison without parole. It is cruel and inaccurate, as the Court has recognized, to pass a final and irreversible judgment on a person whose character is still forming and undergoing significant changes.

Every state acknowledges this relative immaturity of adolescents through civil laws mandating their differential treatment. States restrict adolescents from a wide range of activities that require more mature judgment, such as voting, driving, and consenting to sexual activity. In Florida, the State even restricts the age at which adolescents are allowed to get tattoos, operate golf carts, or attend professional boxing matches. Yet when it comes to criminal sanctions - such as those imposed on Sullivan and Graham - the State disregards this reasoning that young people are indeed categorically different.

The extreme rarity of the punishment shows that it is widely rejected by American society. Only six states are known to imprison juveniles for life without parole in non-homicide offenses. It has been eighteen years since any state sentenced a 13 year old to life without parole for a non-homicide offense. Sullivan is one of only two people in the entire country serving such a sentence. The total number of 13 and 14 year olds sentenced to life without parole for any offense over the last thirty years is 73. Florida is the only state nationwide with a first-time juvenile offender serving life without parole for armed burglary (Graham's offense). This kind of national repudiation has been recognized by the Court as a characteristic of cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. It should similarly be applied here.

Although not at issue before the Court, there is an appallingly disturbing component to these juvenile life-without-parole cases. Adolescents subjected to this punishment are disproportionately children of color. In fact, every single young person sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide offense is a racial minority.

It is my hope that the Court follows its logic in Roper and acknowledges that these punishments must be tempered by an understanding that young people are categorically different in maturity and culpability.

Life-without-parole sentences were designed to deal with the most dangerous offenders who are beyond the pale of rehabilitation. Science, the Court's own precedents, and common sense all teach us that adolescents cannot reliably be categorized among the worst adult offenders. The Court ought to do away with this cruel and inappropriate sentence.